The Fed is officially targeting an inflation range of 1.5-2.0% per the FOMC’s semiannual report to lawmakers. Ben Bernanke is a proponent of inflation targeting having co-authored the book “Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience.” The book highlights a few key benefits of inflation targeting, (1) countries achieve lower inflation rates and lower inflation expectations, (2) price shocks have a reduced impact on sustained inflation; (3) lower nominal interest rates as a result of lower expectations; (4) better transparency and public understanding of monetary policy; and (5) accountability for policy makers. Interestingly, Bernanke notes in his book that inflation targeting has become a popular tool for central banks as result of economists’ belief that monetary policy is not an effective tool for spurring the economy in the short-run.
The book presents three main reasons for the adoption of inflation targeting in the early 1990’s by a host of industrialized nations including New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. First, economists are less confident in monetary policies ability to alter short-run changes in the economy. Secondly, low stable inflation is required for sound economic growth and price stability is essential for imposing accountability on central banks. The book further points out a break-down in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. If inflation inhibits economic growth, moderate-to-high rates of inflation may actual result in higher rather than lower unemployment rates.
Inflation targeting is a relatively new phenomenon, replacing former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s FOMC tool of interest rate targeting informally re-enacted in mid-1980’s (potentially as early as October 1982). Interest rate targeting through the fed funds rate was the result of Greenspan’s assertion there was not a stable relationship between the borrowed reserves and the fund rate. The Fed now believes explicit inflation targeting is the best tool to mitigate the delicate balance between (1) a deflationary (Japan 1990s) economy and (2) an inflationary (US 1970s) economy. The Fed has aptly phrased the paradox as the Two-Headed Dragon.
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